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REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERSECTION
OF LAW AND LINGUISTICS
THIS IS NOT A SENTENCE
PAUL F. CAMPOS*
For any observer-relative feature F, seeming to be F is logically prior to
being F, because-appropriately understood-seeming to be F is a necessary
condition of being F.'
Let be be finale of seem.2
The dream is an old one: reality shall replace appearance, the corruptible
body will surrender to the transcendent mind, the chaotic confusion of the
many will give way to the geometric clarity of the one, and we shall see
not through a glass darkly, but face to face. In American legal thought,
these Platonic urges are usually expressed through the respective attempts
of the formalist to make law "scientific" or "objective," and hence, it is
supposed, objectively knowable, and of the hermeneutician to make it an
evolving object that changes yet remains the same, thereby rendering it
both "legal" and potentially "progressive" or "just."
Both the formalist and the hermeneutic theoretical projects are enabled
by the assumption that the meaning of a text is independent of the
particular intentions of the text's author and of any particular reader's
beliefs about those intentions. For the formalist, the subjective nature of the
author's intention makes it deeply suspect; and in any case, on this view
authorial intention is simply irrelevant. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has put
it, "the process [of legal interpretation] is objective; the search is not for the
contents of the authors' heads but for the rules of language they used."3
In hermeneutic theory, "dynamic" or "evolutive" interpretation is made
possible by the assumption that a stabilized object of textual interpreta-
• Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. A.B. (1982), A.M. (1983), J.D.
University of Michigan (1989).
1. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 13 (1995).
2. Wallace Stevens, The Emperor of Ice Cream, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE
STEVENS 64 (1989).
3. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989).
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tion---"the text of the X"-maintains its essential identity, even as this
object of interpretation takes on new meanings given to it as a consequence
of the very interpretive acts that attempt to determine the object's meaning.
For example, William Eskridge follows the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer
in accepting Gadamer's assertion that "verbal meaning" functions as the
key concept that enables a hermeneutic dialogue between the self-identical
text and the changing interpretive situations in which the text finds itself
situated.' On this view, the inherent semantic attributes of the marks or
sounds that comprise the material manifestation of a text themselves create
the interpretive possibility that those marks or sounds will be perceived
(correctly) as containing whatever verbal meanings those marks or sounds
are permitted to have, in whatever language the text happens to represent.
What this symposium on the intersection between linguistic and legal
theory illustrates well is that the distinction in legal theory between what
is assumed to be a text's inherent formal meaning and its contingent
historical meaning essentially replicates the distinction between "sentence
meaning" and "utterance meaning" that is crucial to various linguistic
theories. The distinction all these theoretical approaches insist on maintain-
ing is that "between the meaning of a sentence and the meaning of an
utterance of that sentence on some particular occasion."6
I think this distinction is illusory and that Georgia Green is correct when
she argues that sentences cannot be interpreted out of context, because, as
she puts it, "sentences don't occur out of context."7 Now if this distinction
is indeed illusory, then the theoretical project of determining the meaning
of a text without reference to the author's intentions is doomed from the
start. In fact, it is doomed, because it is oxymoronic. The various
intellectual enterprises that depend on the existence of "sentence" or
"verbal" meaning (also described as "literal," "conventional," "ordinary,"
or in traditional legal parlance, "plain" meaning) have been constructed on
the basis of a fundamental mistake. The mistake is ontological. "Sentence
meaning" simply does not exist in practice-only in theory. Unfortunately
(unfortunately, that is, for theories of interpretation), linguistic meaning
4. William Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990).
5. For a more extensive account of the relation between Gadamer's work and questions of legal
interpretation, see Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous
Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065 (1993).
6. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory Of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 290
(1985).
7. Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 785, 838 (1995).
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never exists in theory, only in practice. Textual meaning always occurs in
the context of, and indeed is generated by, the intentional semantic content
of a particular utterance. Hence you can't have a true theory of linguistic
practice any more than you can have a true theory of any other set of
contingent facts.
Consider a concrete example. Suppose I want to know how much the
tiger at the zoo weighs. Someone tells me that he doesn't know what this
tiger weighs, but that, "in general," tigers weigh 375 pounds. Of course,
this may or may not prove to be helpful information. Maybe this tiger is
exceptionally large or small. More to the point, such a generalization does
not tell me very much about what interests me, which is just what this tiger
weighs, not what tigers are generally understood to weigh. Now suppose
my informant were to insist that in one sense he has already told me what
I want to know, because all tigers have two weights: 375 pounds (their
theoretical tiger weight) and N pounds (the particular and hence variable
weight of any individual tiger). The strangeness of this statement is obvious
enough when what one seeks to know is what the zoo's tiger weighs. What
theories of textual interpretation overlook is that it is just as peculiar to
answer someone's questions about the meaning of a particular text with the
assertion that, although we don't know what this text means as an
utterance, we can tell you what it means as a sentence. Texts cannot have
meaning "in the abstract" any more than tigers can have abstract weights.
The meaning of a text, like the weight of a tiger, is an empirical question,
and no theoretical generalizations about what tigers weigh or what texts
mean will give you the answer to either kind of question.
I recognize, of course, that it seems highly counterintuitive to assert that
texts do not have conventional meanings. Note that the claim is not,
absurdly, that when we attribute a conventional meaning to a text we are
necessarily mistaken. Rather, the claim is that "sentence" or "conventional"
or "plain" meaning isn't an inherent attribute of texts for the simple reason
that texts don't have inherent formal attributes. The meaning of a text may
indeed be identical with the conventional meaning that it supposedly
manifests, but this will always be a contingent occurrence, the interpretation
of which will require an empirical observation about the author's intention,
not a tautological assertion about the formal qualities of language. Thus,
Georgia Green is surely correct when she asserts that words themselves do
not "have" meanings, and that all interpretation must be, in the technical
1995]
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linguistic sense, pragmatic rather than semantic.'
Now in order to put the case against sentence meaning on the strongest
possible grounds, I will examine the most powerful argument I know of for
the claim that such meanings are inherent in the nature of language itself,
rather than always being, as argued here, the contingent psychological by-
products of actual linguistic practice. In a valuable essay that exposes many
of the key mistakes that plague contemporary theories of legal interpreta-
tion, Larry Alexander asks the reader to imagine the following situation.9
Suppose a person confronts text-like objects that have no authorial source
of signification, and then attempts to interpret-to attribute particular
semantic meanings-to those objects. If an acontextual interpretation is ever
possible-if one could ever successfully interpret sentences rather than
utterances-then, at a minimum, it would have to be possible in this
prototypically acontextual situation. Of course, this activity will make sense
as an interpretive practice only if we can accurately characterize certain
acts of attribution as correct understandings of such an object's semantic
meaning and others as misunderstandings of that meaning.10 If, on the
other hand, we cannot properly make such evaluative distinctions, then such
acts of attribution cannot be considered interpretive acts.
Alexander provides the following account of how we might go about
successfully interpreting such objects." Imagine a cloud formation that
looks like the word "go," or a monkey whose playful striking of a
typewriter produces the letter sequence "w-h-a-l-e," or an accidental
bumping of that typewriter that causes the "i" and "t" keys to strike the
paper consecutively. In each of these cases, authorless phenomena have, on
this account, produced actual words. We know that these marks are words
because of a public convention to that effect; and although such public
conventions are established initially by the semantic intentions of
neologistic speakers, once these conventions are established "shapes and
sounds and the words they produce have the meanings the public
convention establishes independent of any author's or speaker's inten-
8. Id. at 2.
9. Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of
Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 357 (Andrei Marnor ed., 1995).
10. An interpretive practice involves an attempt to ascertain some fact about the world. For the
understanding of any particular text, the relevant distinction is between the attribution and the creation
of semantic meaning: only the former is an interpretive practice. See Campos, supra note 4, at 1082,
as well as Paul Campos, Three Mistakes About Interpretation, 92 MICH. L. REv. 388 (1993).
11. Alexander, supra note 9, at 403.
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tion."' 2 This "dictionary meaning" (mean) of what appear to be words is
thus always available to the interpreter as an independent source of
semantic signification-a source that enables us to undertake correct and
incorrect interpretations of authorless, text-like objects (of quintessential
"sentences" or "sentence fragments") that are not and cannot be interpreta-
tions of any author's intentions.
It follows from this that "a cloud formation that is shaped like the letters
'g' and 'o' meansd [has as one of its inherent attributes the dictionary
meaning of the English word] 'go.""' 13 In the same way, "the monkey's
typing of whale meansd a large aquatic mammal." We properly attribute
dictionary meanings to such authorless objects when the objects in fact
instantiate those meanings. Although it makes no sense to argue about what
the meaning of a set of random marks really is when those marks form a
word with different meanings in different languages (a false cognate), or a
word that has multiple dictionary meanings in the same language (a
homonym), or a word that has both a formal dictionary meaning and other,
less formal meanings when used by various speakers (e.g., idioms,
malapropisms, codes), the uncontroversial fact that we can usefully employ
dictionary meanings when teaching languages to children indicates that
dictionary (i.e., sentence) meaning is always a meaning of any text-like
object-at least of any such object that instantiates a public convention.
Hence the practice of authorless attribution is properly characterized as an
interpretive practice because we can either correctly identify or fail to
identify the dictionary meanings that such authorless objects actually
manifest.
This theoretical distinction between the dictionary meaning and the
author's meaning of a text allows us to ask, as a practical matter, which
(correct) interpretation of a text should be controlling in different
interpretive situations.14 As Alexander puts it, "what is important is that
we be clear about what our practical enterprise is."'" We must then decide
whether the author's intended meaning or the text's dictionary meaning
12 Id.
13 Id.
14. Note that normative arguments concerning the interpretation of texts require the possibility of
interpretations that exclude each other, and yet are still in some non-trivial sense correct interpretations.
That is, normative interpretive theory depends on the belief that interpretive practice sometimes allows
or requires the interpreter to choose between (at least) two mutually exclusive yet simultaneously
"valid" interpretations. By contrast, the argument put forth in this essay leads to the conclusion that
nothing of interpretive interest turns on the claim "the text should mean X"
15. Alexander, supra note 9, at 404.
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should be what guides the interpretation of any particular text.
Alexander's account of how different sources of semantic meaning create
the possibility of different interpretive theories has great intuitive plausibili-
ty. Yet it depends upon the central assertion: Dictionary meaning can be
attributed [correctly] to objects with no authorial intent. Note, however, that
any act of authorless attribution requires an attributing agent: an agent who
declares that a particular object manifests a codified, formal meaning, the
content of which remains independent of anyone's intentions or be-
liefs--even (or perhaps especially) those of the attributing agent who, after
all, believes he is discovering rather than creating the object's semantic
significance.
But can texts or text-like objects actually derive their semantic content
from some codified meta-context of objective meaning? The belief that they
can has been attacked with great effectiveness by deconstructive critics. As
Jonathan Culler puts it:
Any attempt to codify context can always be grafted onto the context it
sought to describe, yielding a new context which escapes the previous
formulation. Attempts to describe limits always make possible [more
precisely, such attempts reveal the latent possibility of] a displacement of
those limits.'6
Culler illustrates this assertion by pointing out how Wittgenstein's claim
that it is impossible to say "bububu" and mean "I shall go for a walk in the
rain" is actually a performative demonstration of the very thing the
philosopher wants to deny. 7
Deconstructionists commonly argue that the ultimate futility of formal
attempts to limit the possible linguistic manipulations of potentially
significant sounds or marks has dire consequences for the epistemology of
interpretation, and perhaps even for the ontology of semantic meaning.
Such assertions are, in my view, non sequiturs: products of a residual
Cartesianism that requires some realm of incorrigible knowledge in order
to properly ground our inquiries. Yet the observation that we can always
be mistaken about the meaning of a particular text is usually no more
significant or interesting than the fact that we can always be mistaken about
any state of affairs-i.e., most of the time, this observation has little or no
practical significance.
16. JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION 124 (1982).
17. Id.
[VOL. 73:971
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What does follow from what Derridat8 and others have called the
ineluctable "iterability" of language? What follows is that the "dictionary"
or "sentence" meaning of a putative word must be like any other mean-
ing-a meaning that may or may not have been conferred, by some
meaning-conferring agent, to a putative word on a particular occasion of
utterance. I say "putative" because to attribute semantic significance to any
encountered mark or sound-to treat it as a signifier-is itself always an act
of interpretation or misinterpretation. Misinterpretation can always occur
because all such acts of attribution remain open to the possibility of two
kinds of mistake. First, we may misattribute what meaning the meaning-
conferring agent in fact conferred to a signifier when the agent generated
that particular signifier. Second, a more radical kind of mistake can occur
if we encounter what appears to be an object that represents an act of
semantic signification that in fact is not an object that represents an act of
semantic signification. In this latter case, any attempt to determine the
proper semantic interpretation of the object is an attempt to determine the
fact of the matter when indeed there is no fact of the matter. Thus a cloud
formation that is shaped like the letters "g" and "o" does not constitute a
representation of a word. We can choose to treat the formation as if it
constituted the representation of a word, but this will remain a
counterfactual attribution of semantic meaning to an object that has none.
This fundamental difference between the representation of a word and a
natural phenomenon that appears to be the representation of a word reminds
us that the physical manifestation of any semantic representation-the mark
or sound-is always an artifactual remnant of some agent's intentional
mental state. It is the difference between finding a stone that is shaped like
a knife, and a stone that has been used as a knife. Only one of these stones
is an artifact, which is to say only one of the stones has been an object of
conscious intentionality, 9 and this distinction will remain crucial to any
account of what each stone's shape signifies.
What I want to insist upon is why, when one attempts to interpret what
appear to be linguistic signs, "public conventions" (i.e., dictionary meaning,
verbal meaning, sentence meaning, etc.) do not and cannot possibly
establish the meanings of those particular marks. Public conventions are not
signifying agents. Public conventions are employed by signifying agents.
If an agent employs a particular convention when producing a signifier,
18. Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context, 1 Glyph 180, 182 (1977).
19. "With consciousness comes intentionality, the capacity of the organism to represent objects
and states of affairs in the world to itself." SEARLE, supra note 1, at 7.
1995]
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then the signifier has the meaning given to it by signifying agents when
they employ that particular convention. Only then will the convention itself
have positive significance for the accurate interpretation of that signifier.
The key point of the argument is that someone must always generate
semantic meaning, because a representation is always the product of some
representer's intention to represent. Linguistic conventions do not exist
apart from their contingent instantiation upon particular occasions of
utterance, and dictionary or sentence meanings can be nothing more than
theoretical generalizations drawn from such particular occasions. Such
generalizations remain just that, which is to say that, like all generaliza-
tions, they will sometimes prove useful and sometimes mislead. Semantic
meaning cannot be generated by linguistic conventions, because linguistic
conventions are tools employed by signifying agents, rather than agents
themselves. Words do not mean; people do.
At bottom, the distinction between semantic meanings and the material
objects that encode those meanings is related to the inexact yet fundamental
ontological distinction between facts that are intrinsic to nature and facts
about human subjectivity." If a cloud formation looks like the word "go,"
the formation's mass, extension, humidity, and so forth would remain what
they were whether there were any subjects in the world to observe those
qualities or not. By contrast, the fact that the formation appears to represent
a word is an observer-relative fact. Without observers, there would be no
such facts. A world without observing subjects might in theory be full of
objects that such subjects would mistake for words or knives. But objects
that are in practice words or knives, or indeed that are mistaken for words
or knives, require subjects who undertake the creation, interpretation, and
misinterpretation of such intrinsically subjective phenomena. Thus, to say
that a monkey's random striking of w-h-a-l-e on a keyboard "means" a
large aquatic mammal is to make a counterfactual observation about the
world. It is to say, "this is an object that if it had been employed as a
signifier probably would have been employed to signify a large aquatic
mammal." To say that "it" nevertheless does mean a large aquatic mammal
is to make a mistaken claim about the existence of a signifier when in fact
no such signifier exists.
The absence of authorial meaning necessarily means the absence of
sentence meaning because sentence meaning, when present, is always a
20. This distinction between observer-relative facts and facts that are intrinsic to nature is
elaborated in JOHN 1R SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MiND 211-12 (1992).
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manifestation of authorial meaning. Marks and sounds are made semantical-
ly meaningful by particular acts of semantic attribution. Language-indeed
semantic meaning of any kind-cannot exist apart from such particular acts.
Accidentally typing "i-t' is not such an act, and those marks when made
by the random action of the typewriter are no more a representation of a
word than "xq" would be a representation of a word if someone accidental-
ly typed that. While it is true that the accidental typing of "it" can be
treated as if it were the representation of a word, so can the accidental
typing of "xq." Neither object is a word; however, both objects would be
words if their production was the result of an intention to generate semantic
meaning. And of course, both objects could be mistaken for words.
Hence, if we were to ask children what words were being formed by a
cloud formation, we would be employing a heuristic fiction: NO such
words exist. Alexander's discussion of such hypothetical phenomena rightly
emphasizes the futility of arguments about "the" meaning of accidental
marks whenever those marks could be taken to signify more than one thing
and could therefore seemingly provide occasions for interpretive dispute."'
Yet because there may always be a difference between a conventional
meaning of a signifier and another conventional meaning of that signifier,
or, to put it another way, between a (more or less) conventional usage and
a (more or less) idiosyncratic usage, it always remains possible to have an
interpretive dispute about what this or that signifier happens to mean. It
follows that no occasion for interpretation can ever be immune to the
possibility of interpretive dispute, because the potential always exists for a
lack of congruence between what speakers mean and what listeners
understand speakers to mean. This, after all, is why we can even talk of
such pluralistic phenomena as utterance meaning, sentence meaning,
malapropisms, ambiguity, and so forth. Therefore, it is always pointless to
make any claim about-that is, to interpret-the meaning of linguistically
acontextual marks because it is pointless to assume (except as a heuristic,
strategic, or playful fiction) that such marks could ever be words.
Moreover, it follows logically that to attempt to carry out valid acontextual
interpretations of intrinsically contextual phenomena-to treat utterances as
sentences-is to attempt to do the impossible.
In brief, if we are dealing with a speech act we can never preclude the
possibility of a dispute about the speech act's semantic content. If we are
not dealing with a speech act, then we cannot say anything about the
21. Alexander, supra note 9, at 404.
1995]
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
event's semantic content other than to note that the event has no semantic
content. At most, such cases present us with an illusion of semantic
content. The cloud formation, the monkey's "whale," the accidental typing
of "it," and the linguistic theorist's "sentences considered in the abstract 22
are all the linguistic equivalents of Rorschach blots, into which we project
the mistaken belief that we are seeing words, just as an archeologist might
mistake a stone that looks like a knife for a stone that someone had
employed as a knife.
Alexander is also right when he says that "what counts is that we be
clear about what our practical enterprise is." This is not merely because
"legal interpretation is a practical endeavor," but also because any
interpretation of linguistic phenomena cannot be controlled by general
accounts or theories of linguistic interpretation.24 The interpretive
enterprise of figuring out what a text means is always a practical rather
than a theoretical endeavor, because it is always an inquiry into a particular
historical fact: the meaning of a particular set of signifiers produced on a
particular occasion by the meaning-conferring agent who produced them.
The depth of the confusion that surrounds these issues is illustrated by
some of the remarkable claims that legal philosophers routinely make when
discussing questions of textual interpretation. For example, consider this
claim put forth by Professor Dennis Patterson:
Intentions do not establish meanings. If you utter the sentence "I would like
minestrone soup" but intended to order chicken noodle soup, the meaning of
your request is clear. Furthermore, your intention is completely irrelevant to
the meaning of what you said.'
This example presents us with a speaker who is producing certain sounds
that signify the speaker's attempt to communicate a request for what the
interpreter calls "chicken noodle soup." By stipulation, the interpreter of
this utterance knows two things about it: The speaker is making sounds that
represent his intention to communicate a request for what the interpreter
calls "chicken noodle soup," and the speaker is making sounds that the
interpreter assumes a certain heuristic fiction called "the ordinary speaker
22. JUDrTH N. LEvi, A SHORT HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC TERMS 1.
23. Alexander, supra note 9, at 404.
24. See Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRMCAL INQUIRY 723 (1982).
25. Dennis Patterson, The Poverty ofInterpretive Universalism: Toward A Reconstruction of Legal
Theory, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1, 14 n. 72 (1993).
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of English" '26 would use to communicate a request for what English
speakers usually call "minestrone soup." So what, exactly, is "clear" about
the meaning of this utterance? As an interpretive matter, everything that
counts: which is to say, the semantic intention of the speaker, the listener's
successful interpretation of this intention, and the listener's understanding
that such an intention would usually be expressed by a different set of
sounds. Note that in practice-and language does not exist except in
practice-language consists of speakers' meanings and listeners' under-
standings or misunderstandings of those meanings. The meaning of a
particular text-and all texts are particular texts-is clear if the listener has
understood the speaker's meaning. The "formal" (i.e., universal, theoretical-
ly specifiable) meaning of a text is a heuristic fiction that may or may not
help us understand any particular text's actual meaning.
I want to conclude by noting that we should, perhaps, find something
troubling in Dennis Patterson's example, and indeed about the whole idea
of attempting to develop comprehensive theories of legal or linguistic
meaning. What concerns me is the implicit juridical impulse that seems to
fuel these intellectual projects. It is as if Patterson's analytical declaration
that X means Y, or Jeffrey Kaplan's assertion that when "the enactor of a
statute performs an illocutionary act of legislating, that enactor is bound by
what he does"27 should be followed by that judicial classic utterance, It is
so ordered. There is something intellectually questionable about the
theorist's authoritarian drive to regulate and simplify the complex and
inevitably somewhat chaotic particularism of legal and linguistic practice
through the deployment of some imperial theoretical construct, whether it
be "sentence meaning," "truth-conditional semantics," "the rule of law as
a law of rules," or making legal language "the best it can be."
All such concepts work within their respective discourses to objectify, to
impoverish, and ultimately to obscure the inescapably subjective nature of
semantic meaning: those acts of signification that are the focus of the
interpretive assertions I used these marks to mean X, Y and Z, you
understood them to mean X, Y and W, and they would have used them to
mean X, Y and T. These two facts and the accompanying counterfactual
26. For an incisive critique of universalist claims about "ordinary meaning," see Stanley Fish,
Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious,
What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 625 (1979), reprinted in
STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORrrY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES
269 (1980).
27. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 7, at 865.
19951
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
(the possible content of which will be as unlimited as the potential
identities and intentions of "they") represent what we might call the
intrinsically subjective matrix of linguistic events. That matrix reveals that
the meaning of a text is always identical with some particular agent's
intended meaning. The assertion "these marks mean X" must mean either
"these marks mean X to me," or "these marks meant X to N," or "these
marks would have meant X to N under the following (counterfactual)
circumstances."
Marks or sounds are semantically meaningful only if they have been
made so by the representational intentions of some meaning-conferring
agent; and the interpretation of such signs is always an attempt to discover
what that agent meant. Whenever it is treated as the methodological or
hermeneutic key to interpretation, the formal stipulation of sentence or
verbal meanings instantiates the same theoretical mistake. For unless we
identify their meaning with the semantic intentions of some meaning-
conferring agent, marks that we wish to interpret as words can represent no
more than a random collection of semantically meaningless objects,
signifying nothing.
[VOL. 73:971
